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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CECIL L. L YN"CH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
J. A. HOGLE, doing business as 
J. A. HOGLE & C0).1P ANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 8022 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
f-;TATEI\fENT OF FACTS 
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Throughout this brief plaintiff and appellant will 
he referred to a~ Lynch, and defendant and respondent 
a:-; Hogle. 
All italics are ours. 
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B. THE FACTS 
rrhis appeal ari:-;e:-; out of a complaint by Lynch in 
which he alleged that Hogle converted 40 shares of 
Ntandard Oil of California stock to his own use, sold the 
:-'to<'k and retained the proceeds therefrom. The evidence 
eoncerning the stock purchase and sale is undisputed. 
It reveals that L~·nch, on the 14th day of ~larch, 1951, 
placed an order with the Richard C. Badger & Company, 
a ~tock broker, at his place of business in Ogden, Utah. 
That thereafter Lynch was informed by Badger's em-
ployees that the purchase of stock had been made at a 
price of 44-% dollars per share and that the total cost 
to him of the stock, plus commission, was $1,793.45. 
Lyneh, on the 16th day of :Jiarch, 1951, paid the price in 
full hy a cashier's check in the sum of $1,793.45 (R. 12, 13, 
79-Exhibits "~\", "B"). 
The order for 40 shares of stock at 44-o/8 dollars per 
share "·as transmitted by Teletype to Hogle. 
The purchase of 40 shares of stock of Standard Oil 
of California at 44-% dollars per share was actually made 
on the New York Stock Exchange by Hogle on March 
15, 1951 at 8 :18 a.m. ( R. 80). The exact time of the re-
ceipt of the order frmn Badger and the purchase in re-
~ponse thereto are shown by copies of the ticker tape in 
the records of the defendant (R. 79, 80). After the pur-
chase on the 15th day of l\iarch, Hogle notified Badger 
in Ogden of the purchase of the -10 shares at 44-% dollars 
per share (R. 81). 
I 
I. 
I 
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3 
The notice to Badger of the purchase contained a 
date on which settlernent for the particular purchase was 
to be made. It was sho\vn as the 20th of March, 1951 (R. 
~~). On the ~Oth day of l\Iarch payment for the 40 shares 
of stock had to be cornpleted in accordance with the Hogle-
Badger interbrokerage arrangen1ent. 
In K e'v York Hogle made the purchase through their 
odd lot broker and at the close of business on the 15th 
there wa~ actually held by Hogle the 40 shares thus pur-
chased, together with 13 other shares which were pur-
chased for other customers. They had in their receipts 
for the day two certificates, one for 50 shares and one for 
3 shares (R. 82-84). 
The nonnal procedure after such a purchase, was 
for the broker, fr01n whon1 the order was received, 
to give instructions for the delivery and transfer of the 
certificate to the purchaser (R. 85). Badger gave no such 
instructions. The stock thus purchased remained in his 
account until the 2-!th day of l\{arch, 1951, on which day 
Badger ordered Hogle to sell 50 shares of stock of Stand-
ard Oil of California (R. 126). 50 shares were sold for 
46-lj8 dollars per share on l\Iarch 24th at 8:38 a.m. The 
settlement date on this sale was the 28th day of l\Iarch, 
1951 (R. 127). No settlement was ever made. Badger 
died on the 27th day of .March, 1951 (R. 40). 
Lynch never authorized Badger to sell the 40 shares 
of stock purchased on his account nor did he authorize 
Hogle to ~ell (R.lS). 
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A l'ter the death of Badger, Hogle sold the 25 shares 
of Standard Oil of California stock which remained in 
the Badger Omnibus Account and received therefrom 
+S-~8 dollars per share (R. Ha). As was customary, 
when Badger purchased stock the purchase was made in 
hi~ own name and likewise when Hogle purchased stock 
for Badger the stock was purchased in the name of Hogle 
(R. 158-160). None of the proceeds from the sale of the 
~toek which had been purchased on Badger's order by 
Hogle was ever paid over to Lynch. 
On the settlement date, i.e., the 20th day of }larch, 
1 ~)31, Hogle received from Badger a check in the sum of 
$40,000. The check was drawn against the First Security 
Bank of Ogden, r tah, and was used in the settling of 
outstanding balances between Hogle and Badger (R. 
103). 
It appears throughout the testimony of l\ir. Max 
Xiemoth, an employee of defendant, that there was han-
dled in Hogle's accounts an open account with the Bad-
ger brokerage which was known as the "Omnibus Ac-
count." In the Omnibus Account was placed all stocks 
purchased by Badger for his customers, and into and 
out of the account Badger deposited or withdrew funds 
from time to time, the only requirement by Hogle being 
that there be in his custody sufficient assets belong-
ing to Badger to give a 25% margin on the purchases 
through the Omnibus Account and a 75% margin on pur-
chases made for Badger personally (R. 104). 
" l 
I 
' J I 
I 
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The cashier'::; check, which Lynch gave for the price 
of hi::; ::;tock. wa::; deposited by Badger in the First Se-
curity Bank of Ogden, Utah, on the 16th day of :March, 
1951 (R. ±3). Out of that account the checks paying to 
Hogle the various large sun1s of n1oney were drawn. 
~-\fter the death of Badger it was discovered that there 
·was an overdraft in the First Security Bank of Ogden 
of something in excess of $9,000.00. 
The record shmvs "·ithout dispute that for some time 
prior to the 15th day of 1\Iarch, 1951 and up until his 
death, Badger and Hogle cooperated one with the other 
to give to Badger current funds which he used in a kiting 
transaction. The actual mechanics were as follows: 
Badger ·would present to Hogle a check on the First Se-
curity Bank of Ogden, Utah. These checks were very 
large in amounts, being in the sums of forty, thirty-two, 
thirty-nine and twenty thousand dollars. For this per-
sonal check Hogle issued his check on the Walker Bank 
& Trust Company. Sometimes the check was in the identi-
cal amount which Badger deposited. On other occasions 
there was a net payment by Badger to Hogle. Badger, 
after receiving the Hogle check on occasions obtained 
from Walker Bank & Trust Company a Federal Reserve 
draft. On other occasions Badger took the Hogle check 
and deposited it in his Salt Lake Bank account at the 
First National Bank. Then Badger drew a check on the 
First National Bank and deposited it in his First Se-
curity Bank account at Ogden, Utah in order to meet the 
check given to Hogle. In this way Badger obtained a 
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two <lay eredit on the amounts of the check which he 
otherwi~e could not have obtained through the usual 
banking <·hannels. After Badger's death a check in the 
~um of $34,000.00, datPd March 24, 1951, and which was 
in the kiting eyele, was presented to the First Security 
Hank of Ogden, Utah and was returned marked "Maker 
Deceased" and "Insufficient Funds" (R. 132, 142). Hogle 
knew of the Badger account at the First National Bank 
in Salt Lake, and knew that the only legal benefit which 
could be obtained by Badger through their check cashing 
service \\'as a two day float (R. 155). In other words, for 
two days Badger would have the use of the money shown 
on the face of his check without paying interest or service 
charges. The checks were not drawn against any balance 
in the Omnibus Account, but were exchanged simply as 
an accommodation for the personal check of Badger which 
was presented prior to the Hogle check being issued (R. 
156). 
~-\.t all tin1es 1naterial to Lynch's cause of action there 
was on deposit with defendant an excess over the mar-
ginal requirements of the U. S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, so that if Badger had desired to so do with-
out the payment of additional funds he could have obtain-
ed for L~Tnch the 40 shares of Standard Oil of California 
stock which he had paid for and which was due him (R. 
157, 158). 
~ 
J 
I 
I 
I 
I 
~ 
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It is only after the death of Badger, the insufficient 
funds check and other unrelated charges are deducted 
that the Badger balance at Hogles fall below the marginal 
require1nent of the S.E.C. 
At the close of Lynch's evidence Hogle moved the 
court for a disn1issal of Lynch's complaint, which motion 
was granted. However, the court made Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree based on the evidence 
"·hich had been presented at the close of Lynch's case. 
In the findings the court found generally concerning the 
type of business Badger and Hogle were engaged in; con-
cerning their relationship; and also findings on the Fed-
eral Reserve Board Rules and Regulations and the Omni-
bus Account and marginal requirements. The court then 
found in paragraph 6 of the findings that Lynch was a 
customer of Badger and had authorized Badger to pur-
chase 40 shares of Standard Oil of California stock on the 
14th day of :J[arch, 1951; that upon receiving the order 
Badger sent a Teletype message to Hogle and ordered 
40 shares of Standard Oil of California stock. The court 
further found that Hogle purchased on the New York 
Stock Exchange 40 shares of stock of Standard Oil of 
California for the account of Badger and credited hin1 
"·ith the 40 shares which were so purchased. 
In paragraph 8 the court found that Lynch paid 
Richard C. Badger for the -1:0 shares of Standard Oil of 
California stock which had been ordered through his 
brokerage. The court then found that there was no cer-
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t i l'i<'atP of ~to<'k ever issued in the name of Badger nor in 
the name of Lynch nor was there any identifiable certifi-
('a te of stock for 40 shares which Lynch could identify. 
rl'he findings also contain a finding that Badger had sold 
~P(·urities in excess of $600,000.00 which belonged to his 
customers and had in effect misappropriated securities of 
his customers before :March 27, 1951. 
Finding 11 is to the effect that the relationship be-
tween Hogle and Badger was one of broker to broker. 
Finding 12 was to the effect that Hogle had no knowl-
edge of Badger's financial difficulties. 
The court also found that Hogle and Lynch had 
both filed claims with the Estate of Richard C. Badger 
and that the claims had been allowed, Lynch's claim in 
the sum which he had paid to Badger; Hogle's claim in 
the su1n of $170,000.00, and that the 25 shares of stock 
remaining in the custody of Hogle, which had been pur-
chased on the order of Badger, were sold pursuant to 
court order. 
There is also a finding that the net loss, if any, to 
Hogle, as result of the Badger account, cannot be deter-
mined until an ultimate liquidation of all securities which 
are held by Hogle and that at this time no finding can be 
made as to the loss, if any, that Hogle may suffer. 
The Conclusions of Law were as follows: That there 
was no privity of contract between Lynch and Hogle and 
J 
l 
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that Hogle i~ not responsible legally or equitably for the 
loss sustained by Lynch; that Lynch is entitled to take 
nothing by his con1plaint and the ~arne should be dis-
nlissed on its merits. 
The Decree n1erely dismissed Lynch's complaint on 
its merits. 
Lynch 1noved the court to amend and modify the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree and 
said motion was duly heard and portions of the motion 
granted. 
The mnendments, which the court allowed, made a 
finding that the -10 shares of Standard Oil of California 
stock, which were purchased by Hogle on Badger's order, 
were in fact purchased pursuant to the order which 
Lynch had placed with Badger. The court also amended 
the findings to find in detail the transactions which oc-
curred at the time of the purchase and sale of the Stand-
ard Oil of California stock which was purchased by Hogle 
on order of Badger and sold on his order. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF WAS THE OWNER OF 40 SHARES OF 
STANDARD OIL OF CALIFORNIA STOCK AFTER ITS PUR-
CHASE ON MARCH 15, 1951. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT CONVERTED PLAINTIFF'S STOCK BY 
SALE WITHOUT AUTHORITY. 
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POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO BE PAID THE PRO-
CEEDS FROM THE SALE OF HIS STOCK. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF WAS THE OWNER OF 40 SHARES OF 
STANDARD OIL OF CALIFORNIA STOCK AFTER ITS PUR-
CHASE ON MARCH 15, 1951. 
The law is clear and unequivocal that stocks pur-
<·ha:-:t><l hy a broker for hi;.; client are the property of the 
client and title thereto immediately vests in the purchas-
ing client. 
Richardson v. ""'lwu·, 209 r.s. 363, 52 L. Ed. 
s:35, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 512; 
Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 26 Atl. 874, 
28 Atl. 106; 
Tuckerman v. Mearns, 49 App. D. C. 153, 262 
Fed. 607; 
Little v. JJ cClain, 134 App. Div. 197, 118 N. 
Y. Supp. 916; 
Barbour v. Sproul, 239 Pa. 171, 86 ~\tl. 714; 
Content v: Banner, 184 ~. Y. 121, 76 N. E. 
913; 
ill arkham v. Jaudon, 41 N.Y. 235. 
The principle of law cited is applied most frequently 
in cases where the customer purchased stock and owed 
a portion of the purchase price to the broker. Where 
J 
I 
I 
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the purcha~e i~ one for cash or the price is paid in full, 
the rule that the title and property to the stock vests 
i1nmediately in the client is applied more strictly than in 
the marginal purcha~e ca~e~. Such is the rule set forth in 
Gorman r. Littlefield, :2:2~) lT. S. 19, 33 S. Ct. 690, 691. In 
the Gorman case, as in the case at bar, the clain1ant could 
not identify by certificate number the particular certifi-
cate for 100 share~ which had been purchased on his order. 
The court discussed the customary practice of purchasing 
stock for custmners and taking the certificat~ in the nan1e 
of the broker, the transfer to the nan1e of the customer 
occurring at the time the stock is delivered. The Su-
preme Court then recites as the law governing this situa-
tion the following: 
"In the subsequent case of Sexton v. Kessler 
& Co., :2:25 r. S. 90, 56 L. ed. 995, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
657, this court, speaking of the relation of custo-
n1er and broker, said (p. 97): 
"''Yhen a broker agrees to carry stock for a 
custon1er, he may buy stock to fill several orders 
in a lump; he may increase his single purchase by 
stock of the san1e kind that he wants for himself; 
he may pledge the whole block thus purchased for 
what sum he likes, or deliver it all in satisfaction 
of later orders, and he may satisfy the earlier 
eustmner with any stock that he has on hand or 
that he buys when the time for delivery comes. 
Yet, as he is bound to keep stock enough to satisfy 
his contracts, as the New York firm in this case 
was bound to substitute other security if it with-
drew an~·, the customer is held to have such an in-
terest that a delivery to him by an insolvent broker 
is not a preference. Richardson v. Shaw, supra; 
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~r arkham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235. So, a depositor 
in a grain elevator may have a property in grain 
in a certain elevator, although the keeper is at 
liberty to mix his own or other grain with the 
(lqwsit, and empty and refill the receptacle 
twent ~, times before making good his receipt to 
the depositor concerned.' 
"It is therefore unnecessary for a customer, 
where shares of stock of the same kind are in the 
hands of a broker, being held to satisfy his claims, 
to he able to put his finger upon the identical cer-
tificates of stock purchased for him. It is enough 
that the broker has shares of the same kind which 
are legally subject to the demand of the custo-
mer. And in this respect the trustee in bankruptcy 
is in the same position as the broker. Richardson 
v. Shaw, supra." 
The conclusion in the Gorman case was as follows: 
"It is said, however, that the shares in this 
particular case are not so identified as to come 
within the rule. But it does appear that at the 
time of bankruptcy certificates were found in the 
bankrupt's possession in an amount greater than 
those which should have been on hand for this 
customer, and the significant fact is shown that no 
other customer claimed any right in those shares 
of stock. It was, as we have seen, the duty of the 
broker, if he sold the shares specifically purchased 
for the appellant, to buy others of like kind, and 
to keep on hand subject to the order of the custo-
mer certificates sufficient for the legitimate de-
mands upon him. If he did this, the identification 
of particular certificates is unimportant. Further-
more, it was the right and duty of the broker, if 
he sold the certificates, to use his own funds to 
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keep the anwunt good, and this he could do with-
out depleting hi:S estate to the detri1nent of other 
creditors who had no propery rights in the certi-
ficates held for particular customers. No credi-
tor could ju:Stly de1nand that the estate be aug-
Inented by a wrongful conversion of the property 
of another in this n1anner, or the application to 
the general estate of property which never right-
fully belonged to the bankrupt." 
In Hedges r. Burke} 147 Tenn. 247, 247 S.W. 91, it 
was held on the facts of our case that title to the stock, 
which had been purchased by a corresponding broker for 
the broker who dealt directly with an individual client, 
vested in the client from the moment the stock was paid 
for by the client or the moment that it was purchased by 
the corresponding brokers. 
Wahl'//. Tra.cy} 139 Wis. 668, 121 N. W. 660, similarly 
held that cash purchases of stock vested in the customer 
the title to the stock in the broker's hands from the time 
of the stock purchase. 
In Tuckerman 'IJ·. Mearns} 49 App. D. C. 153, 262 Fed. 
607, it was held that the legal title to the stock purchased 
on credit advanced by the broker vested in the customer 
immediately upon the purchase. 
Massachusetts is one of the few jurisdictions which 
holds that the broker retains title to stock purchased on 
margin and that there is only a debtor-creditor relation-
ship existing between the broker and the customer. How-
ever, in Gifford L Eastman, 251 Mass. 540, 146 N. E. 
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17:~, it \\'as held that where stock is purchased and the 
price paid in full the stock became the property of the 
customer and the broker was merely an agent. See also 
Brou-n , .. Nuslilon, ~~:~~Tass. RO, 111 N. E. s.~-t-. 
Sterlin_r;'s Estate, 25-t- Pa. 1;)5, 98 Atl. 771 is another 
instance of the broker purchasing on credit for his custo-
mer and the court holds that the title to the stock thus 
purchased vested in the customer and not the broker. 
For a similar holding see Content 1:. Banner, 184 N. Y. 
1:21, 76 N. E. 913. 
In La IIIJJrecht v. Sta.te, 84 Ohio St. 3:2, 95 N. E. 656, 
the rule of Richardson v. Shaw was applied by the Ohio 
courts and adopted as the law of Ohio. · 
Sack~·ille r. Wimer, 76 Colo. 519, 233 Pac. 152, does 
not apply the vesting of title principle, but sets forth the 
law of many other jurisdictions which have applied that 
principle. The case is annotated at 41 A.L.R. 1258. The 
annotation discusses all of the cases cited herein and 
demonstrates beyond refutation that as a legal principle 
there is little, if any, dissent from the Richardson doc-
trine that the title to stock purchased through a broker 
vests in the customer upon the fulfilling of the customer's 
order. 
The forms which Badger and Hogle used illustrate 
clearly the relationship that exists between the broker 
and a customer ordering stocks. Exhibit "C", which is the 
notice to Lynch of the purchase by Badger, states on its 
face the following: 
I j 
' I 
I 
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.. "Te haYe this day BOUGHT for your ae-
connt and ri~k on the N.Y.S.E." 
~-\.ll of the incident~ of ownership immediately fol-
lo\ved the purchase by Badger for Lynch. Plaintiff was 
entitled to all dividends fron1 the date of purchase and all 
other rights which flowed from the purchase of the stock. 
On the Hogle invoice to Badger, showing the purchase of 
the -!0 shares of Standard Oil of California stock, Hogle 
again included the phrase which indicates clearly that 
Badger \Yas the owner of the stock. Hogle's language 
is as follows (Exhibit "L") : 
"I'"nless otherwise indicated, we as brokers, 
have this day 1nade the following transaction for 
your account and risk." 
Badger was a stock broker. The purchase by Hogle 
\\·as made through Badger's Omnibus Account. :Mr. Nie-
moth, an einployee of years of experience with Hogle~ 
stated without contradiction and without cross-examina-
tion that he knew that the purchases made through the 
Omnibus Account by Badger were purchases made for 
customers of Badger and not for Badger's personal ac-
count. If Badger made a personal purchase through the 
Omnibus Account he would be violating S.E.C. regula-
tions because on purchases on his personal account he 
had to supply a margin of 75%, while on purchases 
for his custmners he was entitled to a margin of 25o/c. 
The leading authority concerning the relationship 
existing between stock brokers and their customers is 
H icha.rdsou 1'. Slzmr, 209 F.S. 365, 52 L. Ed. 835, 28 S. Ct. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
:->12, :-> 1 :->. In the Ri,cha.rdson case there was before the 
lTnited :-·Hates Supreme Court a bankrupt stock broker 
alHl a ('nstomer ('!aiming certificates of stock which had 
been pnn·hased through the bankrupt. The court exam-
ined carefully the facts and reviewed all the law then 
existing on the relationship of stock broker and customer. 
The court stated the relationship existing, in the follow-
ing language: 
"At the inception of the contract it is the cus-
tomer who wishes to purchase stocks, and he pro-
cures the broker to buy on his account. As was 
said hy Jlr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the 
court in Galigher v. Jones, 129 U.S. 193-198, 3:2 
L. ed. 6:>~, 659, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 335, a broker is 
but an agent, and is bound to follow the directions 
of his principal, or give notice that he declines the 
agency. 
''The dividends on the securities belong to the 
customer. The customer pays interest upon the 
purchase price, and is credited with interest upon 
the margins deposited. He has the right at any 
time to withdraw his excess over 10 per cent de-
posited as margin with the broker. Upon settle-
ment of the account he receives the securities. In 
this case the broker assumed to pledge the stocks, 
not because he was the owner thereof, but because, 
by the terms of the contract, printed upon every 
statement of account, he obtained the right from 
the customer to pledge the securities upon general 
loans, and in like manner he secured the privilege 
of selling when necessary for his protection. 
"The risk of the venture is entirely upon the 
customer. He profits if it succeeds; he loses if it 
fails. The broker gets out of the transaction, when 
j 
~ 
l 
I 
I 
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clost'd in accordance with the understanding of 
the partie~. his connni:;;sion and interest upon the 
adYnncl'~. and nothing ebe. That such was the 
arrangernent between the parties is shown in the 
te::;tinwny of the broker's agent, who testified: 'If 
these stocks carried for J. :t\I. Shaw & Company 
rnade a profit, that profit belongs to Shaw & Com-
pany over and above what he owed us.' 
"\Vhen Young, the agent of Shaw & Con1pany, 
dernanded the stocks, their right of ownership in 
thern was recognized, and, while pledged, they 
\\-ere under the control of the broker, were 
prmnptly redeerned, and turned over to the custo-
rner. Consistently with the tenns of the contract, 
as understood by both parties, the broker could 
not have declined to thus redeern and turn over 
the stock, and, when adjudicated a bankrupt, his 
trustee had no better rights, in the absence of 
fraud or preferential transfer, than the bankrupt 
himself. Security \Y arehousing Co. v. Hand, 206 
U.S. -!15, -:1-:23, fl1 L. ed. 1117, 1122, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
7:20; Thomr..,on v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516, 526, 
-±9 L. ed. 57/, 586, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306; Hurnphrey 
v. Tabnan, 198 U. S. 91, 49 L. ed. 956, 25 Sup. Ct. 
Rep. :S67; York ~Ifg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U. S. 34-!, 
:1;3:2, :)0 L. ed. 782, 7S:S, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. -!81. 
"It is objected to this view of the relation of 
custorner and broker that the broker was not 
obliged to return the very stocks pledged, but 
nright substitute other certificates for those re-. 
ceived by him, and that this is inconsistent with 
ownernship on the part of the customer, and 
shows a proprietary interest of the broker in the 
shares; but this contention loses sight of the fact' 
that the certificate of shares of stock is not the 
property itself, it is but the evidence of property 
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in the ~lwn·~. The <·Prtificate, as the term implies, 
hut <·Prtifi<'~ tlH· ownership of the property and 
righb in the corporation rPpresented hy the num-
ber of shares named. 
"A <·Prtificate of the same number of shares, 
although printed upon different paper and bear-
ing a different number, represents precisely the 
same kind and value of property as does another 
certificate for a like number of shares of stock in 
the same corporation. It is a misconception of the 
nature of the certificate to say that a return of a 
different certificate or the right to substitute one 
certificate for another is a material change in the 
property right held by the broker for the custo-
mer. Horton Y. :\forgan, 19 K. Y. 170, 75 Am. Dee. 
311; Taussig v. Hart, 58 N. Y. 425; Skiff v. Stod-
dard, 63 Conn. 198, 218, 21 L.R.A. 102, 26 Atl. 874, 
2~ A tl. 10-±. A~ was said by the court of appeals 
of K ew York in Caswell Y. Putnam, 120 N.Y. 153, 
1;)7, 24 X. E. 287, 'one share of stock is not differ-
ent in kind or value frmn every other share of the 
same issue and company. They are unlike distinct 
articles of personal property which differ in kind 
and value, such as a horse, wagon, or harness. 
The stock has no earmark which distinguishes 
one share frmn another, so as to give it any addi-
tional value or importance; like grain of a uni-
form quality, one bushel is of the same kind and 
value as another.'" 
Ever since the Richardson decision was announced 
it has been recognized by all courts as the binding au-
thority concerning relationship of stock broker and cus-
tomer. A fairly recent case citing Richa.rdson v. Shmr, 
.and other authorities is Blankenhorn~Hunter-Dulin Co. 
I 
l 
j 
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r. Thayer, 1D9 l ~al. 90, :2-l-7 Pac. lOSS. The California 
court ~et~ forth its understanding of the Richardson de-
cision in the following language: 
"~eYeral propositions seem to be well settled: 
(1) That, as between a broker and a customer who 
has paid for stock in full, the latter is the owner 
of the stock, and does not impliedly authorize the 
broker to pledge the security. ~-\.s to the fully paid 
customer, the pledging of his stock by the broker 
is "·rongful * * * ." 
Concerning plaintiff's ownership, it will be observed 
by the court that the plaintiff's payn1ent to Badger for 
the ~tock purchased for hin1 was deposited by Badger in 
the First Security Bank of Ogden on the 16th day of 
~larch, 1951. Fron1 the First Security Bank of Ogden ac-
count Badger withdrew the following sums on the follow-
ing dates (Exhibits .. J" and"!{:"): 
$:25,000 __________________________________________________ :l\Iarch 16, 1951 
:25,000 __________________________________________________ ~larch 19, 1951 
-l-O,OOO __________________________________________________ .J[arch 20, 1951 
These checks were checks nu1nbered 17002, 17702 and 
1770-l-. The~· were paid to Hogle~ Xieuwth, Fiogte's wit-
ness, stated that the settlement date \vas a date on which 
there must be settlement for purchases Inade with said 
settlement date. It will also be observed by the court that 
the following checks were paid by Hogle on the dates 
\\-hich Hogle received the Badger checks listed above: 
$33,-l-OO.OO ______________________________________________ ~Iarch 16, 1951 
JO,OOO.OO ______________________________________________ ~[arch 19, 1951 
3S,OOO.OO ______________________________________________ ~larch 20, 1951 
:2,000.00 ______________________________________________ .Jlarch :20, 1951 
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The checks enumerated above show without possi-
hility of <·ontradietion that the money which was received 
l>~· HadgPr from plaintiff was paid to defendant. The 
ehecks f'urth<'r prove \Yi thout possibility of contradiction 
that dPf'endant had been paid for the stock which wa;-; 
ordered by Badger on behalf of Lynch. 
It is plaintiff'~ position, which he feels is supported 
1>~· all of the evidence and is uncontradicted by any evi-
dence, that on the 20th of ~r arch, 1951 Badger settled 
with defendant for the purchase of the 40 shares of 
Standard Oil of California stock, which was purchased 
on Lynch's order. 
It appears frmn the clear legal principles applicable 
and from the facts presented to the trial court that Lynch 
was the mvner of the stock purchased on his order when 
that order \Yas filled and that he had paid in full not 
only to Badger, but to Hogle for the stock purchased 
on his account. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT CONVERTED PLAINTIFF'S STOCK BY 
SALE WITHOUT AUTHORITY. 
Plaintiff owned 40 shares of Standard Oil of Cali-
fornia stock which had been purchased by Badger 
through Hogle. This proposition seems to be clear and 
without serious doubt from the cases cited in the preced-
ing point. Once having established his ownership Lynch 
J 
I 
I 
l 
I 
j i 
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submits that the eyidence is uncontradicted that Hogle 
eonverted the ~tock which he owned, and is in possession 
of the proceeds frmn said conversion. 
In Richardson r. Slwzc. supra, there was no equivo-
cation on the proposition that the broker who deals with 
his customers stock in other than an authorized manner 
is engaged in wrongful conduct. A great number of the 
cases concern the1nselves w·ith the question of the broker's 
authority where the custmner has authorized the use of 
the 5 tock in the obtaining of credit by the broker, or in 
the language of the stock exchange, has purchased his 
~tock on 1nargin. ~Iarginal speculators are in a very 
different category from purchasers of stock who pay 
the full price in cash. 
Lynch's testimony that he gave no authority to sell 
the Standard Oil of California stock which had been pur-
chased on his account by Badger, is uncontroverted and 
undisputed. There is no contention that Badger nor any-
one else had authority to sell, pledge or in any way 
handle the stock purchased for Lynch except to order its 
transfer and delivery to him. 
A great number of cases have dealt with the legal 
effects of sale or pledge by brokers who have no authority 
from their customer. One of the landmark cases is In re 
T. A. JJ!clntyre & Co., 181 Fed. 955, 958. The Circuit 
Court of Appeals there dealt with one custmner of the 
~fcintyre brokerage, and the discussion is under the 
heading of ''Appeal of Pippey." Pippey had deposited 
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with tl1P l\1(' [ntyre brokerage 18 shares of Pullman Com-
pan~' <·oumwn stock. :M<·Intyre pledged Pippey's certifi-
('H1<' without his authorit~'· l\Icintyre then became bank-
rupt and the question arose as to whether or not Pippey 
was entitled to the return of his certificate, which was in 
the hands of the pledgee of the ~Ieintyre company. The 
Circuit Court held that the pledge of Pippey's stock with-
out authority "'as a lareeny of his stock. Their language 
is unequivocal and clearly sets forth the principles which 
are applicable in the present case. 
"* * * The firm had no right to pledge them 
for any of its own debts. vVhen "it did pledge them 
to the trust company, the day before its failure, 
the firm had no transaction pending and was 
itself indebted to Pippey. This was a larceny of 
his stock. Tompkins v. :Morton Trust Co., 91 App. 
Div. 21 -+, SG N". Y. Supp. 520; Kavanaugh v. 1\Ic-
Int:Te, l:Zs App. Div. 722, 112 N. Y. Supp. 987. 
X o one disputes that proposition. By reason of 
the circumstances that when he left the certificate 
with the brokers it was duly indorsed with a trans-
fer in blank executed hy himself, he exposed him-
self to risk of losing his stock if the person to 
whom it was pledged, in good faith, for a valuable 
consideration, found it necessary to sell it in order 
to secure payment of his advances. That would 
be solely because Pippey would be estopped from 
asserting his title against the person who had 
parted with value on the faith of the transfer he 
had signed. But the pledgee has not found it nec-
essary to sell the Pulhnan stock. It has repaid it-
self from other items of the pledged property. 
It no longer has any lien on such property. It can 
no longer avail of any doctrine of estoppel. Pip-
I 
j 
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pey·~ title to his ~tock is absolute. I Ie is entitled 
to the certificate which represents that title. The 
trustee~. in the language of the United States Su-
preine Court, 'have no better right in (it) than the 
bankrupt.' Thomas Y. Taggart, 209 IT. S. 385, 28 
~up. Ct. 319, 3:2 L. Ed. ~-+5." 
There is one distinction between the facts in the 
Pippey case and the facts in plaintiff's appeal. Pippey's 
stock was identified by certificate number. This fact is 
innnaterial and so held in Gorman r. Littlefi.eld, supra. 
However, there is an additional authority which is UTI-
distinguishable frmn plaintiff's appeal on the question of 
identical certificates or identifiable certificates. 
In re Brou·n et al., 185 Fed. 766, concerned the bank-
ruptcy of a brokerage concern doing business under the 
name of A. 0. Brown & Co. One of the appeals \vhich the 
Circuit Court discussed was by Helen ni. Wilkin. Wilkin 
had ordered fron1 Brown & Co., 10 shares of American 
Locomotive Cmnpany stock. She was informed on the 
day of her order that the stock had been bought frmn 
Carlisle, nfellick & Co., firm of brokers doing business 
on the floor of the X ew York Stock Exchange. vVilkin 
and A. 0. Brown & Co., consummated their transaction 
at Utica, Xew York After "\Vilkin received notice of the 
purchase she gave her check for $583.73 to Brown & Co., 
in full pa:nnent for the purchase of the 10 shares of stock. 
Her check was deposited in the account of Brown & Co., 
and paid in due course. Wilkin never received her stock 
certificate. On the day she placed her order with Brown 
& Co., it bought through Carlisle, :Mellick & Co., on the 
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floor of til<' New York Stock Exchange 10 shares of 
A lll<'rican Locomotive Company stock. On the same 
dn~· Brown & Co., ordered Carlisle, Mellick & Co., to sell 
lO ~hare~ of American Locomotive Company stock, and 
~ix da:·~ later Carlisle, Mellick & Co., settled with Brown 
& Co., on the two transactions. The trustee In re Brown 
took the position taken in Lynch's appeal by Hogle. The 
trustee claimed that no stock was ever purchased for l\1:rs. 
"'\Vilkin and therefore that she was entitled to the pur-
chase price paid hy her out of the funds received from the 
F tica City 1\ a tional Bank. The court held that was not 
so. It followed through the purchase by Carlisle, Mellick 
& Co., and the sale of an identical number of shares of 
the same stock by Carlisle, :\Iellick & Co. It then found 
that A. 0. Brown & Co., not having given the stock to 
Wilkin and not having it in their possession at the date 
of their bankruptcy n1ust be regarded as having convert-
ed it. 
Plaintiff's evidence in the present case is much 
stronger than the evidence of \rilkin in the Brou·n case. 
There is no dispute but what an actual delivery of 40 
shares of Standard Oil of California stock was made to 
Hogle. There is no dispute that between the 15th day of 
1\Iarch, 1951 and the 24th day of March, 1951, Hogle held 
in its Omnibus Account for Badger 75 shares of Stand-
ard Oil of California stock. 40 of those shares were the 
property of Lynch. When they were sold Badger and 
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Hogle converted plaintiff's property and the proceed~ 
frOin that conYPrsion, the evidence shows without dis-
pute, re~nain in the hands of Hogle. 
There are a ntuuber of brokerage bankruptcy cases 
"~hich discuss inconceivably complicated situations which 
occur where brokers have dealt fraudulently and illegally 
with the nwneys and property of their clients. These 
cases all adhere to the principles which are set forth in 
Pippey's appeal and In re Brou·1z. The cases are enlight-
ening but not specifically in point. As illustrations, see 
In re ~llason et al. Kier v. Steer, :2S:2 Fed. 202; In re J. F. 
Pierson, Jr., & Co., :2:25 Fed. 889; In re J. C. Wilson & 
Co., :23:2 Fed. 631; In re Brown et al., 175 Fed. 769; In re 
Ennis et al., 187 Fed. 720. 
Concerning the general proposition of whether or not 
Hogle, because of his complicity in the conversion of 
Lynch's 40 shares of Standard Oil of California stock 
can be held as a converter, the law seen1s to be relatively 
clear and \vithout serious dispute. Early in our legal 
history this court in Bowe v. Palmer et al., 36 Utah 21-1, 
102 Pac. 1007, held that an agent acting for and on behalf 
of his 1naster could personally be held responsible for 
the conversion of a tenants property. 
In the jurisdictions surrounding l7tah a nu1nber of 
cases have held that persons benefiting by the conversion 
are liable for said wrongful appropriation of the prop-
erty .. .\~ exmnples see Hardie v. Peterson et al., 86 1\font. 
I :lO, :2S:2 Pac. 49-1; Bruton v. Sakariason, 21 N. ~I. 438, 
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155 I >ae. 725; CarzJenter et al. ?;. Scott et al., 109 Okla. 207, 
2:~:> I >ae. 1 ()~; George W. Brown & Sons State Bank of 
J>ofen e/ ol., 1:~~ Okla. 1~1, 2/0 Pac. 9; Durin L Dou·liny 
ct al., 14G Wa;-;lJ. 137, 262 Pac. 123; Cone r. !vinson, 4 
\r yo. 203, :1:> Pac. 933. 
It would seem to be clear beyond possible dispute 
that it is not ne(·essary that a contractual relationship 
exist before a conversion can be claimed by the owner of 
property. For such a holding, however, see Coats & Wil-
liamson, Inc., 1:. Moran & Co., et al., 67 Cal. App. 46, 227 
Pac. 213. 
The American Law Institute Restatement of the 
Lmr of Torts, Yol. 1, p. 595, Sec. 233, states as follows: 
··Sec. 233. Conversion by Disposition by Agent or 
Servant as Against One Other Than Bailor. 
"(1) Except as stated in Subsection ( 4), one 
who as agent or servant of a third person disposes 
of a chattel to one not entitled to its immediate 
possession in consun1n1ation of a transaction nego-
tiated by the agent or servant is liable for a con-
version to another who, as against his principal 
or n1aster, is entitled to the immediate possession 
of the chattel." 
As an example, the editors of the Restatement cite 
the following illustration: 
"2. A employs B, his broker, to sell certain 
bonds payable to order. B sells the bonds to C and 
delivers then1 pursuant to the sale. Both B and C 
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nrL' ignorant of the fact that ~\ had stolen the 
bond~ and forged the nmne of D, the last endorsee. 
B is liable to D." 
From the authorities cited and frmn the application 
of logic it would seen1 clear that Hogle converted the 40 
shares of stock. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO BE PAID THE PRO-
CEEDS FRO~I THE SALE OF HIS STOCK. 
Plain tiff is en ti tied to be paid the proceeds fron1 the 
:::ale of his stock and any other disposition of said fund 
would be an unjust enrichment of Hogle at the expense 
of Lynch. Throughout the cases which are cited in the 
preceding two points the bone of contention giving rise 
to the litigation has been who is entitled to preference in 
the funds found in the hands of bankrupt brokers. The 
rules which have been recited have been formulated by 
courts bent on doing justice between contending credi-
tors. The general creditors are always prevented from 
benefiting frmn the security of creditors who have pre-
ference. 
Gorman r. Littlefield, supra, and Richardson v . 
. ~'haze, supra, decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
~tates, and the Circuit Court cases which have been cited, 
all hold that as between a customer whose stock has been 
converted by the broker and a customer whose stock has 
been rightfully used by the broker, the owner of the .con-
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verted 1-~toek i1-1 entitled to a priority, and must be paid 
in full hefon· any of the assets of the broker can be used 
to benefit the general creditors or customers whose stock 
has been rightfull)· appropriated by the broker. A sum-
tnary of the pn•c·eding (·a;.;e1-1 decided by the United States 
Supreme Court was made by Justice :McReynolds in 
D1tel v. Hollins et al., 2-1-1 r. S. 523, 36 S. Ct. 615, 616. 
In his opinion he succinct!)· set;.; forth the principle in 
the following language: 
••*'' * * K o creditor eould justly demand that 
the estate be augmented b)· a wrongful conversion 
of the property of another in this Inanner, or the 
application to the general estate of property which 
neYer rightfully belonged to the bankrupt." 
In re Brou·n et al., 175 Fed. 769, 770, a case arising 
out of the A. 0. Brown and Co., bankruptcy. The custo-
mer of the brokerage there had furnished to the brokers 
money for the purchase of stock. The stock had been 
bought and paid for by the brokers and afterwards con-
verted to their own use. The Circuit Court of the Second 
Circuit in ruling that the customer could not rescind the 
contract between himself and the broker and follow his 
original purchase money as a trust fund sets forth the 
rights and remedies of the customer in the following lan-
guage: 
"\Vhile \Ye approve the ulti1nate result reached 
by the District Judge, we think the ruling that 
the claimant had the right to rescind the whole 
transaction upon the conversion of its shares and 
follow the purchase price erroneous. The right to 
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re;::;eind a contraet and recover that which has been 
parted with under it does not exist in a case like 
the present. That specific right is available only 
in cases of fraud, undue influence, or duress. 
·· 'Vhen the brokers, after purchasing the 
;::;hares ordered and paid for by the claimant, 
\\Tongfully converted them, the claimant had an 
election of rernedies : 
.. (1) It rnight have brought an action of tort 
for the conversion . 
.. (:2) It rnight have waived the tort and sued 
for the proceeds of the shares-if in money-and 
also have followed such proceeds as a trust fund 
in the hands of the brokers or their bankrupt 
estate. 
•· (3) Asstuning that it was the obligation of 
the brokers under their contract, not only to pur-
chase the shares, but to deliver them, the claimant 
had the right to treat the conversion as a breach 
of contract and sue for damages . 
.. ( -!) Sirnilarly, it had the right to treat the 
conversion as a discharge of the contract and sue 
in assumpsit upon the implied contract to refund 
the money paid. 
"But in the last case - as in the others -
the right of action originated when the conversion 
took place. Then for the first tirne there was an 
implied contract to repay the moneys advanced 
to purchase the shares. Nothing which had taken 
place was annulled. The claimant's moneys had 
been expended precisely in accordance with its 
directions. Any trust attaching thereto had been 
fulfilled. There was no money in the brokers' 
hands clothed with a trust after the stocks ordered 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
had IJ<·<·n hought and paid for. And if there were 
an~· such money after the conversion, it was the 
I>roePP<h: of the ~lwres, and not the purchase price 
thereof." 
It is Lynch's position that the Circuit Court's opin-
ion is sound in all re.-;pechl, that he should be allowed to 
follow the proceeds from his converted stock into the 
hands of Hogle. It will be recalled by the court that the 
settlement date for the payment of the proceeds of the 
sale of the 50 shares of Standard Oil of California stock 
ordered sold by Badger on the 24th day of March was the 
28th of ~larch and that Badger died on the 27th of March. 
No settlement "·a8 eyer 1nade. The court will also recall 
that the proceeds from the 25 shares of Standard Oil of 
California stock i~ likewise still in the hands of defend-
ant. As far as tracing the proceeds from the sale of plain-
tiff's stock, those proceeds have not been paid out or left 
the hands of Hogle. 
Taking a different tact the court will be well aware 
1,, 
I 
of the fact that there i~ in possession of Hogle funds in ilit 
excess of any secured demand which they could make 
against the Badger estate. The accountants' report, intro-
duced by defendant and marked Exhibit "G", contains 
at page 23 the following statement: 
"Included in the above total is a check in :1 11 
amount of $34,000.00 payable to J. A. Hogle & Co. 
On reference to that firm's accounts on Exhibit H1 
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.. ~-\'',it will be noted that it holds collateral valued 
in exeess of the liability owing-, which liability as 
stated has been reduced bY the anwunt of this 
$3±,000.00 check: the question seems to logically 
a rise as to whether or not the collateral pledged 
will also secure this outstanding check." 
Interpreting the quote in the light of the evidence 
it appears that Hogle cashed a check which was returned 
for insufficient funds. Exa1nining the accounting made 
by :Jir. :Jiaw and by the Certified Public Accountants, 
\Yells, Baxter & :Jiiller, it appears that for the $34,000.00 
pa~-ment n1ade to Badger h~- Hogle, Hogle received only 
a check from Badger in a like sun1 of $34,000.00. This 
check was issued on the 26th of :March, 1951 and returned 
to Hogle marked "Insufficient Funds" and ··~raker De-
ceased." ~\s to the $34,000.00 clai1n it is Lynch's position 
that Hogle is in no better position than a general creditor 
of the estate of Badger, and when we consider the further 
circumstance that Hogle furnished the funds which Bad-
ger used in the kiting circuit in which he was engaged, 
the equities would seem to be overwhelmingly in favor 
of -an innocent, unimplicated customer whose securities 
have been converted and the proceeds from the conver-
sion traceable into Hogle's hands. Lynch subn1its that 
as between Hogle and himself, he is entitled to be paid 
the proceeds fron1 the sale of his stock which are in 
Hogle's possession. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that this court should 
n•yenw tit(' judgment of dismissal heretofore entered 
hy the trial court and order a reinstatement of plaintiff's 
cause of action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RA\YLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
D"\VIGHT L. KING 
Co11nsel for Plaintiff and 
.Appellant 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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